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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department 
of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Defense Acquisition Programs 
Wednesday, May 16, 2012  
3:30 p.m. – 
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Chair: Lorna B. Estep, Deputy Director of Logistics, Air Force Materiel Command 
Discussant: Katherine Schinasi, Independent Consultant, former Managing 
Director, U.S. Government Accountability Office 
Basis for a Rational Defense: Acquiring the Right Capability 
J. David Patterson, National Defense Business Institute, The University of 
Tennessee 
Analysis of Alternatives: Keys to Success 
John F. Schank, RAND Corporation 
Lorna B. Estep—Ms.Estep is the deputy director of logistics at the Directorate of Logistics and 
Sustainment, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. Ms. 
Estep is a member of the Senior Executive Service. She is responsible for the Materiel Support 
Division of the Supply Management Activity Group, a stock fund with annual sales of $7 billion. She 
directs a wide range of logistics services in support of Air Force managed spare parts, to include 
transformation programs, requirements determination, budgeting, acquisition, provisioning, 
cataloging, distribution and data management policy. She also provides supply chain management 
policy, guidance and direction in support of headquarters, air logistics centers, and U.S. Air Force 
worldwide customers. 
Estep started her career as a Navy logistics management intern. She has directed the Joint 
Center for Flexible Computer Integrated Manufacturing, was the first program manager for Rapid 
Acquisition of Manufactured Parts, and has served as technical director of Information Technology 
Initiatives at the Naval Supply Systems Command. In these positions, she has developed logistics 
programs for the Department of Defense, implemented one of the first integrated and agile data-
driven manufacturing systems, and directed the development of complex technical data systems for 
the Navy. 
Katherine Schinasi—Ms. Schinasi is currently an independent consultant. Until its sunset in 2011, 
Ms. Schinasi was a commissioner with the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, a position she was appointed to by the Senate Majority Leader. The bipartisan 
Commission was established and charged with recommending contract-related improvements in 
contingency environments. Ms. Schinasi continues to provide advice and assistance to Congress on 
implementing the Commission’s recommendations. 
Beginning in 2009, Ms. Schinasi was a senior advisor to The Conference Board, a non-profit 
research firm in New York. As such she was responsible for conducting and commissioning 
academic-level research on 21st century information and communications networks and their impact 
on society and culture. She co-edited The Linked World: How ICT is Transforming Societies, 
Cultures, and Economies and continues to provide assistance to the business community on those 
issues. 
From 1978 until March 2009, she was employed by the Government Accountability Office, 
serving the last six years as managing director for acquisition and sourcing management. Her 
portfolio included operations in the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and 
cross-governmental acquisitions. In her position, Ms. Schinasi testified frequently before 
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congressional committees on topics of defense trade and investment, export controls, the acquisition 
of services and major developmental systems, and the relationship between government and private 
sector businesses. 
She was a frequent lecturer at the Defense Acquisition University, the Industrial College of the 
Armed Forces, and the Naval Postgraduate School. Her team of 180 people, based in five U.S. 
locations, was responsible for recommendations that led to billions of dollars in savings and improved 
government operations, including those involving government-contractor relationships. She was 
appointed to the federal Senior Executive Service in 1998. 
Ms. Schinasi received an MA in international relations from the School of International Service, 
American University, and a BA in government and politics from the University of Maryland. 
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Basis for a Rational Defense: Acquiring the Right 
Capability 
J. David Patterson—Patterson is the executive director of the National Defense Business Institute 
(NDBI) at the University of Tennessee. He is the former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense, Comptroller, and served as the executive director of the Department of Defense's Defense 
Acquisition Performance Assessment study. He was special assistant to the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense and held executive positions in the defense industry. Patterson is a retired Air Force officer 
with 25 years of service. NDBI provides assistance and resources to both the Department of Defense 
and the defense industry to produce services, systems, and equipment more effectively and 
efficiently. [dpatterson@utk.edu] 
Abstract 
Once the Soviet Union was gone, the United States set about adjusting its national security 
strategy and its planning approach to deal with what appeared to be a void in adversaries. 
Meanwhile, the United States dealt with the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. The U.S. military and its 
allies handled the Iraqi invasion quickly and in a manner that appeared effortless. The ease 
with which the United States and its allies operated in and over Iraq in 1991 was due largely 
to the formidable conventional capability available, a legacy of the Cold War. The first Gulf 
War proved to U.S. military planners, if nothing else, that other world actors could be 
dangerous; but who were they, and where and when might they become a real threat? 
“Uncertainty” became the focus of tailoring a military capability. However, military planners 
knew that some level of capability was required for the United States to remain the 
superpower. Consequently, threat-based planning gave way to capability-based planning. 
With the adoption of capability-based planning came problems. The most troubling problem 
was that capability-based planning drove the planning process to adjust necessary capability 
to fit a defense budget. This paper suggests that planners consider a more threat-based 
approach. 
Introduction 
It was the 1990s. It was a new world. The soviets were no more. The “evil empire” 
had crumbled, and the well-defined threat that had loomed so large for the better part of 
eight decades had evaporated almost overnight. Of course, there was China, but China was 
not the Soviet Union. And there was the problem of Saddam Hussein, but he was pretty 
much in irons, having been soundly and quickly defeated after Iraq’s short-lived invasion of 
Kuwait. The U.S. Air Force and Navy aviation had Iraq bound on the northern and southern 
borders with Northern Watch and Southern Watch no-fly zones. The metamorphosis from a 
clearly understood, unambiguous, focused, and well-defined threat—the Soviet Union and 
its surrogates—had evolved into something far less obvious. The specter of T-72 tanks and 
armored personnel carriers lined up on the eastern side of the Fulda Gap as far as the eye 
could see was a memory, not a reality. The long-feared yet unthinkable nuclear missile 
exchange, with its mutual, assured destruction, had become a curious notion of the past.  
So what was the United States to do with all of the capability built over many years to 
address a threat that didn’t exist anymore? Because describing a new threat was proving 
difficult, the Department of Defense and its planners elected to eliminate the planning steps 
of describing a threat and developing requirements to meet the threat and go right to 
describing “capabilities” that the United States must pursue.  
The explanation for this approach was that rather than facing a “clear and present 
danger,” the United States was faced with having to plan for uncertainty. This meant that 
planners had to provide capabilities that would address a “wide range of modern-day 
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challenges” in a limited-resource environment that demanded making choices. Capabilities-
based planning (CBP) was the formal name given to this approach of defense planning.  
What follows is an argument that suggests that the CBP model should be re-thought. 
Does CBP provide a rational approach to planning and thereby establish a defensible logic 
for acquiring the right quantities and types of weapon systems? The argument is based on a 
premise that if CBP were rational, it would have achieved the purpose for which it was 
developed, and the Department of Defense would be acquiring the right weapons and 
services in the right quantities. The thinking is that it would be irrational or unreasonable to 
purposefully and knowingly adopt a planning methodology that would not achieve its stated 
objective.  
Additionally, CBP may be found wanting on the basis that it’s foundational reasoning 
is not internally consistent. As an alternative, returning to more of a threat-based planning 
may be more likely to achieve its purpose and may be more internally consistent. More to 
the point, historically, threat-based planning enabled the Department of Defense and the 
military departments to make the if-then argument, that is, if an enemy has the will and the 
means to inflict harm on the United States or its allies, then the United States must 
accurately describe, meet, and defeat that threat with the right capability in numbers that are 
sufficient.  
Additionally, the argument posits that without basing the requirement on a defined 
threat for a specific capability, advocates for a specific capability have no evidence on which 
to build a case for the capability. The Service chiefs and Department of Defense supporters 
are left very vulnerable to the obvious question: “why?” Why does the Air Force require 187 
F-22s; why does the Navy need 11 carrier battle groups? Why does the Army need 45 
brigade combat teams? Without threat-based planning, the military advocates are left with 
the not-so-compelling answer: “Well, because.”  
The United States is once again faced with the specter of a declining budget. 
Weapon systems being developed currently and being considered for future development 
are expensive and not likely to get less expensive. Having a rational view of acquiring these 
systems is critical and must give more importance to a well-reasoned understanding of the 
threats the United States faces.  
Origin of Capability-Based Planning 
Understanding the evolution in thinking that produced CBP is helpful in appreciating 
why the CBP process misses the mark in providing a tool for weapon system and national 
security strategy advocacy. CBP did not happen overnight. As early as 1987, when Admiral 
William J. Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, began an unprecedented, candid 
series of discussion with his counterpart, Chief of the Soviet General Staff Sergie 
Akromeyev, there were indications that the decades-long military standoff between the 
United States and the Soviet Union was ending (“Biographies,” 2007). 
The disappearance of the Soviet Union and its surrogates with the attending 
existential threats came relatively suddenly. While Americans were celebrating Christmas in 
1991, the golden hammer and sickle was raised above the Kremlin in Moscow for the last 
time (History Channel, 2012). The United States’ national security establishment did not 
have much time to warm to the idea of not continuing to face a potential, enormous, 
conventional, as well as nuclear threat. The Russian bear, a formidable foe for nearly 46 
years, disappeared as T. S. Eliot would have described it: “not with a bang, but a whimper” 
(Eliot, 1925).  
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The fall of the Soviet Union was for Kremlin watchers probably an event that was 
expected as inevitable, but the swiftness with which the decomposition took place was 
surprising for most of us. The breakup of the Soviet Union did not come from a dramatic, 
precipitous, and internal upheaval that spread outward; rather, it started at the periphery 
with Poland’s and Czechoslovakia’s peaceful revolutionary movements that inspired 
independence movements throughout Easter Europe. Inexorably, the march for freedom 
from the shackles of the Soviet sphere of influence produced one independent government 
after another until all but Georgia, the Soviet, and Warsaw Pact nations were on their own 
(History Channel, 2012). 
Though the world shouted its approval, with the United States leading the cheering 
section, the disappearance of the monolithic and focused Soviet threat presented the United 
States with an unanticipated dilemma: What now? Is it necessary to maintain the most 
powerful military capability in the history of mankind? To answer these questions, it is 
instructive to look at some of the thinking that went on in the Joint Staff regarding the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. To be fair, the joint planning community had been 
considering “what if” options should the Warsaw Pact no longer presented a threat. 
In late 1989, the Joint Staff was aware of and making force and capability planning 
decisions prompted by “favorable threat trends” (Larson, Orletsky, & Leuschner, 2001). 
Additionally, there were “soaring” budget deficits and congressional enthusiasm for a “peace 
dividend”1 that was pressuring the Administration to reduce defense spending. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff proposed a 2% annual rate of growth, but the tide of advocacy for reducing 
the Department of Defense’s budget to a flat line of no growth and the Administration could 
not overcome the momentum of cutting defense. It was clear that it was during the early 
1990s that the beginning of the build-to-budget approach had gained traction. The ubiquity 
of vagaries of the defense budget cannot be over emphasized. The specter and anticipation 
of reduced defense funding accelerated the need for a concept of establishing a force 
structure that met the challenge of defense budget reality. 
In the 2001 RAND study Defense Planning in a Decade of Change, the researchers 
describe the attempt by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, to 
establish a baseline force structure that would be the lowest level of capability that would 
maintain a prudent level of post-Cold War capability (Larson et al., 2001). There was the 
potential, albeit slight, that there could be a resurgent “Soviet/Russian threat.” But if a “Base 
Force” were to be established, it would be defined as a “flexible” force capable of meeting a 
full “spectrum of threat” (Larson et al., 2001). Without a clear understanding of what the 
threat was that the Base Force had to deal with, the Base Force was subject to the budget. 
From 1990 to 1995, the Base Force was defined by an ever-decreasing defense budget. 
The foundational thinking was that, without a Soviet threat, some level of capability had to 
be established that would be able to meet whatever emerging hostile force it encountered. It 
was the precursor to CBP. 
For context, and by way of comparison, as the case for a Base Force emerged, cuts 
in force structure were understood. The Joint Staff developed a briefing that established the 
Base Force military end strength to meet whatever opposing force the United States might 
encounter. The Base Force military manpower levels would be achieved over several years 
with the objective force structure achieved in 1994. A Base Force would be the minimum 
required in a non–Soviet-threatened world. As Lorna Jaffe from the Joint History Office 
explained in The Development of the Base Force 1989–1992, 
                                                
1 It would be some years later that the Congress would conclude that the “peace dividend” was “peace.” 
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For an interim force structure to be reached by 1994, the briefing proposed 
an active strength of 630,000 for the Army; 520,000 for the Navy; 500,000 for 
the Air Force; and 170,000 for the Marine Corps--a total reduction of 287,000 
from current strength, with corresponding cuts to be taken in reserve forces. 
For the minimum forces required for the United States to carryout its 
superpower responsibilities, it projected an active strength of 560,000 for the 
Army; 490,000 for the Navy; 490,000 for the Air Force and 160,000 for the 
Marine Corps—a total reduction of 407,000 from current strength, again with 
corresponding cuts to be taken in reserve forces. (Jaffe, 1993) 
Contrast these force structure numbers with the 2013 President’s Defense Budget 
Request, funding active duty forces for an Army end strength of 490,000, a Navy end 
strength of 319,000, an Air Force end strength of 328,000 and a Marine Corps end strength 
of 182,000 by fiscal year 2017 (DoD, 2012). These end strength numbers are a 381,000 
reduction in end strength from what was considered the Base Force necessary in 1994.  
Gregory Treverton’s 1989 article “The Defense Debate” in Foreign Affairs put the 
nexus of budget pressure and reduced Soviet threat succinctly:  
The string of incredible events in Eastern Europe has only given credibility to 
U.S. intelligence estimates of a less menacing Soviet Union. The reduced 
Soviet threat, combined with pressure from budgeteers, prompted Secretary 
of Defense Dick Cheney to try to head off the defense debate for 1991. The 
Pentagon was told to plan for a budget cut by several percent and to look for 
continued savings-as much as $180 billion during 1992-94. (Treverton, 1989) 
The 1990s saw a precipitous decline in defense spending without much reference to 
threat or strategy. Funding levels mostly drove defense program activity. In a General 
Accounting Office2 (GAO) December 1992 report, “Weapons Acquisition: A Rare 
Opportunity for Lasting Change,” the authors made a comment that was certainly prescient 
and may well be most characteristic of the evolving nature of force planning in the 1990s. 
The researchers stated,  
Weapon system acquisitions involve highly leveraged decisions with 
significant consequences for the budget and national security. A few discrete 
decision on weapon systems can commit the nation to spending tens of 
billions of dollars, can represent national security policy choices, can shape 
how wars are fought, and can effect the relative roles and functions of the 
military services. (GAO, 1992) 
The choice of weapon systems, according to the GAO, because of the levels of 
spending, drives national security policy. This is the priority order of decision-making: first 
the capability, then fitting the capability to a declining budget, and then developing a policy 
to make use of the capability. It may seem backwards, but it is the sequence of thinking that 
comes when there is little acknowledgement of a defined threat to build a national security 
policy to counter. There was another problem. How was the Department of Defense going to 
maintain a force structure with a declining budget? As mentioned earlier, it wasn’t. Force 
structure would have to match reduced spending. 
Technology was to be the means of accommodating declining force structure. The 
idea was beguiling and played to the United States’ formidable technological capability and 
to a defense industry more than adequate to the task. Applying rapidly growing technology 
                                                
2 The General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1992 was renamed the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
effective July 7, 2004.  
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to weapon systems development invoked a historically apt concept of Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA). As Murray (1997) explained in “Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs,” 
“Yet one must also admit that military events of late suggest major changes in technology 
and weapons with substantial implications for conducting war in the next century.” 
Revolution in military affairs would be the buzzwords to fill the void until military planners 
could build a planning framework that would acknowledge an unpredictably hostile world, 
while living within an uncertain level of defense funding. CBP was just such a framework. 
The 2001 QDR established CBP as the Department of Defense’s official force 
planning process, replacing the threat-based construct. Additionally, the focus of the 
planning was “non-country-specific continuum of capabilities from minimal force to nuclear 
weapons” (Zavadil, Tindal, & Kahan, 2003). Lamb, Lutes, Bunn, and Cavoli (2008) pointed 
out that CBP incorporated a point of view regarding how an enemy would fight with what 
capability: 
Arguing that the United States could not know the origin of threats decades 
from now, QDR 2001 focused instead on the idea of anticipating the kinds of 
capabilities that an adversary might employ. A capabilities-based model 
would focus more on ‘how an adversary might fight than who the adversary 
might be and where a war might occur,’ and it would require identifying 
capabilities that U.S. military forces would need to deter and defeat 
adversaries who will rely on ‘surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to 
achieve their objectives. 
The cornerstone of CBP is to determine and plan for the tactics (i.e., the how and the 
what) a potential enemy might employ rather than attempt to identify the enemy and where, 
as well as when, that enemy might threaten U.S. national security. 
The Tenets of Capabilities-Based Planning 
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU; 2011) definition of CBP is “an overarching 
framework for planning under uncertainty that provides capabilities suitable for a wide range 
of modern-day challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework 
that necessitates choice.” The DAU (2011) definition expanded puts emphasis on five 
elements: 
1. The construct that CBP is a “process” incorporating “existing processes into a 
single framework.” 
2. An admission that it is not possible to “predict every threat scenario. Planning 
under uncertainty forces us to plan for the most dangerous and most likely 
threat capabilities.” 
3. An exhortation to “provide capabilities that let us prevail against the most 
likely threats.” 
4. Our “capabilities must face a wide range of challenges and circumstances.” 
5. An acknowledgement that “we live under an economic framework that simply 
cannot provide everything. We must prioritize problems, and we must 
recognize excesses that waste taxpayer dollars.” 
The DAU (2011) definition goes on to explain that CBP is not just “reform or simple 
change from old ways of thinking,” but rather that CBP provides (a) “the reorganization 
needed to meet the new and emerging threats to the United States,” (b) “extensive support 
to the warfighters,” and (c) “new resources and support for the managers who develop the 
requirements for U.S. forces.” 
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The DAU explains that the resulting CBP process “combines existing processes” that 
will be able to make available “better products” with reduced ‘re-work’ of the ‘systems’ 
developed.” Additionally, this new “approach” takes advantage of the “strengths of 
organization, teamwork, and depth of resources” available to the Department of Defense. In 
short, CBP will be a hedge against not knowing what threat the United States might face, 
while planning for and being prepared for the widest imaginable variety of opposing 
capabilities, all while realizing there would be constrained resources. 
Weaknesses in CBP 
As mentioned, there are two principal weakness or flaws in CBP. First, the reasoning 
in CBP is not internally consistent. As a framework or planning construct, CBP cannot 
logically achieve what it purports to achieve. Second, in practice, CBP has not achieved 
what framers of the CBP construct had promised because the outcomes that they hoped 
would improved by CBP were influenced by other pressures or drivers. 
To be internally and logically consistent, a concept must not have an internal 
contradiction. CBP begins with a contradiction. The Department of Defense cannot identify 
and adequately characterize a specific threat and therefore has described the national 
security environment as one of uncertainty. Consequently, the Department of Defense will 
plan for uncertainty. In other words, the planning will be for a variety of potential 
eventualities that may be certain to occur. Though the notion is that CBP is addressing a 
resource-constrained environment, CBP is not bound by a funding ceiling at the outset; but 
rather it is limited by congressional budget limitations after the fact. This thinking, applied to 
developing national security capability, is inefficient at best and could leave the United 
States vulnerable to attack from an enemy with a capability that was outside the potential 
eventualities. 
Turning again to Lamb et al. (n.d.) and their monograph in “Transforming Defense 
Strategy and Posture,” they made the following point: “First, the assumption that it is easier 
to anticipate the tactics an adversary will use than it is to predict the identity of the adversary 
is open to challenge.” Clearly, a case could be made that it would have been easier to 
predict where the threats to the United States might have originated for Operation Enduring 
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Furthermore, one could argue that if the identity of a 
prospective adversary were believed to be accurate, then the time, place, and capability to 
be faced would be known with more accuracy.  
At the beginning of the President George W. Bush Administration, most inside the 
Pentagon took the position that promised “a future force that is defined less by size and 
more by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and sustain, one that relies 
more on stealth, precision weaponry, and information technology” (Lamb et al., 2008). 
However, turning to the most recent defense strategy, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 
Priorities for 21st Century Defense, a primary mission for the U.S. armed forces is the ability 
to “Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges” (DoD, 2012). CBP does not 
necessarily prompt the Pentagon point of view. The conclusion that what the United States 
requires is a capability to deploy “advanced remote sensing, long-range precision strike, 
transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces and systems, to over come anti-access and 
area denial threats” does not absolutely follow from a capability-based focus. It may 
increase the potential that defense planners will evaluate more positively those capabilities. 
But it is not a certainty (Lamb et al., 2008). 
In his paper written for a National War College assignment “Capabilities-Based 
Planning: The Myth,” Jeffrey Kendall (2002) addressed the weakness of CBP to 
accommodate fiscal realities. Kendall (2002) asserted that the “theoretical assumption” on 
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which CBP is based fails to meet what he described as the “ways” (i.e., capabilities) that are 
“severely mismatched” with the “means,” the resources available to fund the capabilities. In 
CBP, it may be tempting to assume that describing a capability needed to address a 
potential adversary’s capability would be immediately embraced by congressional check-
writers, but it is not supported historically. Congress seldom provides the Department of 
Defense blank checks. It seems reasonable that if a planning construct is to be internally 
consistent, it should deal sensibly and practically with budgetary and fiscal realities. 
The second major weakness in CBP is that, as a framework and process, it is not 
capable of achieving what it was meant to achieve. The basic tenets of CBP hold that it will 
provide “better products and less re-work of the systems developed” (DAU, 2011). How CBP 
provides “better products” is unclear. The acquisition community has not seen significant 
improvements in terms of cost, schedule, and performance.  
Kratz and Buckingham (2010) described the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) as the enabler of CBP “based on strategic direction and 
priorities defined in the National Military Strategy and National Defense Strategy.” The 
strategic direction, however, is not directly connected to the acquisition system that the CBP 
process depends on to acquire the “better products.”  
In fact, the real irony is that, according to the “Defense Acquisition Performance 
Assessment (DAPA) of 2006,” “the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 
like its predecessors, is slow and complex. It is particularly ill-suited to respond to urgent 
needs arising from current operations and is structured for a ‘Cold War,’ traditional 
opponent” (Kadish, 2006). The process that was developed to meet the needs of 
“uncertainty” and address a potential adversary that is unknown is now judged to be more 
appropriate for the Cold War, which doesn’t exist anymore (Kadish, 2006). 
In the DAPA report, Kadish (2006) went on to say,  
Most of the comments that the Panel received concerning the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System found it too complex, with 
little added value in defining capabilities that require Material Solutions or that 
establish actionable parameters to guide program definition. The 
consequence is a widely-held doubt that the Department is acquiring the 
“right things” in the “right quantities.” 
If Kadish is correct, then getting the right things in the right quantities to the 
warfighter has little to do with CBP as a process.  
Lastly, the CBP as process is incapable of managing the vagaries of the realities of 
acquiring capability. Because capability is not tied to a specific threat through a requirement, 
deleting the capability or reducing the quantity through senior military actions or 
congressional funding reductions cannot easily be assessed in terms of risk to national 
security. In a system where the threat is well described as country- or region-specific failure 
to fund a capability to address a requirement to meet a threat, a threat can be legitimately 
argued as increasing risk to national security. A case is more easily made that increasing 
the funding lowers the risk.  
A basis for a more rational defense force structure can be made by recognizing that 
there is ambiguity in the exact nature of the threats facing the United States, but taking a 
more immediate view of what impacts force structure will help. 
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Basis for a Rational Defense 
The basis for a rational defense is proposed to prompt thinking about a better, more 
logical way to go about planning for and acquiring weapon systems capability. The current 
assault on the defense budget requires a more substantial and reasoned foundation for 
advocacy of acquiring capability. 
The premise that drives a rational defense is that there are state and non-state 
actors whose worldviews are inimical to the interests of the United States and its allies. 
These state and non-state actors have the means and the will to endanger the United States 
and its allies and therefore represent definable but multiple threats that drive requirements 
that must be addressed with a weapon system capability. This construct allows for an 
acquisition system that is tailored to satisfy requirements to address threats that are met 
with discreet or generalized capabilities.  
A rational defense gives appropriate weight to the capabilities necessary to counter 
hostile state and non-state actors and the specific capabilities they bring to the threat arena. 
What is proposed here is not a purely threat-based planning approach, but rather an 
approach to planning that is constructed and adopts an understanding of threat as the 
antecedent in the force structure-planning process. Additionally, this force structure-planning 
proposal is more focused on informing the weapon system acquisition process in a practical, 
streamlined, and effective way than is the CPB.  
First, to understand where this proposal fits, a look at the was, as is, and to be broad 
view will be helpful. Figure 1 shows graphically how the basis for rational defense planning 
(BRDP) compares what has gone before with a purely threat-based planning approach and 
the current planning methodology relying on the JCIDS for capability development (Kratz & 
Buckingham, 2010). Several differences are evident. There is an integrated bottoms-up 
explanation of the threat as seen and assessed by the combatant commanders (COCOM), 
the warfighters most intimately familiar with the threats manifested in the areas for which 
they are responsible. The COCOMs are also in the best position to describe both the 
warfighting requirements and when the latest time a capability must be fielded to meet the 
requirements. The time-to-field is all too often lost in the process of developing capabilities. 
Time-to-field is integral in identifying and assessing the threats in the COCOMs area of 
responsibility because it answers the question of when the threat will manifest itself in a way 
that must be dealt with actively and with a military capability.  
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Figure 1. Threat vs. Capability-Based vs. Basis for Rational Defense Planning 
Note. This figure was adapted from a chart developed by Steven Chadwick in a June 20, 
2007, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress entitled Defense Acquisition: Overview, 
Issues, and Options for Congress and used by Kratz and Buckingham (2010). 
The as-is approach places the COCOMs’ inputs to the capabilities development 
process with the Service-unique strategy visions. Combining the train, organize and equip 
responsibilities of the Services with the unified command responsibilities of execution makes 
the process confusing and often does not give the COCOMs ample voice in the capability 
development process.  
The Joint Staff then analyzes the COCOM-developed requirement to assess which 
of military Service-unique capabilities meets the requirement. Additionally, when more than 
one capability solution is available, the Joint Staff analyzes and validates the capability that 
best meets the requirement. Where more than one COCOM has identified the same or 
similar requirement, the Joint Staff prioritizes which COCOM will receive the capability first 
and in what quantity. There is a feedback step to ensure that the Joint Staff assessment in 
fact meets the requirement as described by the COCOMs. 
With the National Security Strategy providing the overarching guidance from the top 
and the COCOMs describing the threats to national security, what is required to meet the 
threat and when the requirement must be satisfied in the field comes up from the bottom, 
and the joint capability required is identified in the middle step. 
The JCIDS process, with its 161 pages of instructions and explanations, its multitude 
of reviews, its documents, and its oversight processes, needs to be re-engineered with 
fewer moving parts. Starting with the COCOMs’ assessment of threats to U.S. national 
security emanating from their areas will drive capability decisions to a more streamlined 
process. Sponsorship for defined requirements and time-to-field capabilities to address the 
requirements are the warfighters with the most at stake. Time-to-field assessments will 
motivate capabilities development timeframes that have a basis in a warfighter’s real need. 
Reducing non-value added administrative processes would be a logical outcome. 
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Budgets and funding are entrenched facts of life that need to be taken into 
consideration at the highest levels. Fiscal guidance from the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) must be considered when determining what capabilities necessary to meet 
requirements will also satisfy the National Security Strategy.  
This proposed construct benefits from the ability to tie strategy to budgetary realities 
to satisfy a warfighter’s requirement for a given capability. If funding realities are such that 
Congress does not wish to fund a capability in deference to other priorities, then the 
consequence can be established as increased risk to national security. The BRDP 
establishes the clear link between defense spending and a reduced threat to national 
security. 
There is another benefit to the BRDP. It establishes threats to national security in a 
larger context with the U.S. domestic agenda, as well as with the nation’s industrial base 
capacity, to meet the demand for weapons to satisfy national security needs. When reduced 
to basics, three key factors impact national security, as illustrated in Figure 2. The 
interdependence of the key factors is important in advocating for national security programs. 
 
Figure 2. The Threats Facing the U.S. Fit Into the National Security Context 
With the shadow of very draconian cuts to the defense budget hanging over defense 
planners, if there is a reduced willingness to fund defense capability programs, then the 
defense industry is weakened and the critical aspects of the industrial base are difficult to 
sustain. Particularly fragile is the number of formed and experienced developmental design 
teams. The money to sustain the industry is driven by the larger national agenda, both 
national security and domestic economy. Budget cuts prompt the aerospace and defense 
industry to reduce workforces at worst and freeze hiring at best (Aerospace Industry 
Association, 2011). If the perception is that a highly probable threat exists, then the need to 
address that threat will be more competitive with the domestic economic agenda and there 
will be a greater willingness to fund defense capability supporting the defense industry. 
Figure 2 does not explain every dynamic taking place, but it is useful in describing 
how the threat is a factor in sustaining industry and competing with other elements of the 
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national agenda. The threat in this larger context is helpful in advocating for defense 
programs in a way that simply explaining the need to fill a capability gap is not. 
Conclusion 
CBP was an expedient and useful force structure and capabilities planning tool 
during a period when defense funding was on the rise and was used to address the 
existential threats of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, as those 
operations are winding down and national domestic funding imperatives are taking center 
stage, a more concrete link between potential hostile actions from state and non-state actors 
whose purposes are inimical to the U.S. national security and planning to address those 
threats is needed.  
The BRDP, as an alternative to CBP, is one approach that provides threats that the 
United States faces a more prominent role in defense planning. It links the threats to 
necessary funding to pay for the capability that meets the requirements that counter the 
threats. Giving the threats that the United States faces around the world a more prominent 
position in defense planning is worth considering and will give defense advocates a more 
compelling case in defending defense spending. 
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